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 Although age-related differences in the correspondence bias are often attributed to 
cognitive decline, the present study found that age-related differences in the 
correspondence bias were differentially influenced by the participants’ mood states.  
Young and older participants completed an attitude-attribution task after having been 
induced to experience a positive, neutral, or negative mood.  Whereas older adults 
demonstrated the correspondence bias more strongly in the negative mood condition 
relative to the positive mood condition, young adults exhibited the exact opposite pattern 
of results.  Interestingly, the positive mood manipulation led older adults to be no more 
dispositionally biased than their younger counterparts.  Further, mood and age-related 
differences in attributional confidence were not eliminated after controlling for individual 








Past research on social judgments has shown that there is a tendency for observers 
to overestimate the degree to which a given actor’s behavior is caused by factors internal 
to the actor.  Moreover, research on aging and attributional reasoning has consistently 
demonstrated that older adults are more prone to these dispositional biases in their causal 
inferences than are young adults.  Although cognitive decline is often considered to be 
the most likely candidate as the source of age-related differences in causal attributions 
(for review, see Hess, 1999), other social factors have also been found to impact 
attributional processes.  Mood is one such factor that could impact the attributional biases 
of young and older adults.  Past research on the correspondence bias has shown that 
positive moods lead to more extreme dispositional biases in college-aged individuals, 
whereas negative moods lead to less extreme dispositional biases (Forgas, 1998).  In the 
current study, we sought to extend past research by examining the role that mood plays in 
the attributions of young and older adults.  More specifically, we examined the impact 
that mood has on age-related differences in the correspondence bias.  
Correspondence Bias     
A large portion of the research on attributional reasoning is devoted to exploring 
those factors which influence the correspondence bias.  This bias emerges when an 
observer overestimates the degree to which an actor’s behavior is caused by his or her 
personal characteristics while underestimating the degree to which the actor’s behavior is 
driven by factors beyond his or her control.   Research on attributional biases supports a 
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three-stage model for evaluating the behavior of others (Gilbert, 1998).  Within this 
model, an observer first identifies an actor’s behavior and then estimates the extent to 
which the actor’s behavior is due to his or her dispositional characteristics and personal 
qualities.  Because these first two steps are spontaneous and relatively automatic, 
observers tend to rely on dispositional factors to explain the actor’s behavior.  In the final 
stage, an observer may correct his or her initial evaluations of the actor’s behavior using 
noticeable environmental factors that could also play a causal role in the actor’s behavior.  
Because correcting initial dispositional attributions requires effortful processing, 
observers who are distracted or who are under a cognitive load exhibit an impaired 
capacity for correcting their initial dispositional attributions (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 
1988; Krull, 1993).       
The attitude-attribution paradigm is one of the predominant methods used to 
investigate causal inferences in a social context (Jones & Harris, 1967).  Participants are 
given an essay that either endorses or opposes a certain social issue (e.g. capital 
punishment).  In addition, they are told that the person who wrote the essay either (a) was 
allowed to choose which position to take on the social issue, or (b) was specifically 
assigned a position on the social issue.  These two conditions represent the absence or 
presence of a situational constraint on the target writer’s behavior, respectively (Jones & 
Harris, 1967; Krull, 1993; Choi & Nisbett, 1998).  Typically, participants in the choice 
condition rate the writer’s “true” attitude as being correspondent with the direction of the 
essay that they were asked to read, and they tend to be highly confident in this attribution 
(Devine, 1989; Jones & Davis, 1965).  When the writer’s behavior is constrained, 
however, participants attend to this situational constraint and are thus less likely to rate 
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the writer’s true attitude as being correspondent with the stance adopted in the essay.  
Moreover, the presence of the situational constraint reduces the confidence with which 
participants form their attributions.  Failing to adequately consider the situational 
constraint can lead to evaluations that are based exclusively on the participant’s 
dispositional attributions towards the writer.  In practice, these dispositional biases are 
often referred to as the ‘correspondence bias’ because the participant infers that the 
writer’s behavior is correspondent with the writer’s disposition when in actuality it might 
not be.   
Factors Influencing the Correspondence Bias 
 Over the past three decades, researchers have examined a number of variables that 
can influence the correspondence bias.  More extreme dispositional biases have been 
found to result from a low need for cognition, a high need for closure, an individualistic 
cultural identity, and the inability to recognize situational constraints (Chiu, Morris, 
Hong, & Menon, 2000; Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Devine, 1989; Gilbert et al., 1988; Krull, 
1993; Tetlock, 1985; Trope & Gaunt, 2000; Yzerbyt, Corneille, Dumont, & Hahn, 2001).  
Of particular relevance to the current study, mood has also been shown to influence the 
correspondence bias (Forgas, 1998).  Individuals who were induced to experience a 
positive mood were found to be more susceptible to demonstrating the correspondence 
bias.  They were also less able to recall the arguments presented by the essay writer in his 
or her essay.  These results were taken as evidence that individuals in positive mood 
states engage in less effortful processing when asked to assess the writer’s true attitude on 
the social issue addressed by the essay.  On the other hand, participants in a negative 
mood state were less susceptible to the correspondence bias and demonstrated improved 
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recall of the contents of the target’s essay.  As a result, negative mood states were thought 
to lead individuals to engage in more effortful processing and to thus increase the 
likelihood that participants would correct their initial dispositional attributions using the 
situational factors that were acting to constrain the essay writer’s behavior.  
Unfortunately, because the research described above has only been conducted on young 
adult samples, the influence that mood and each of the other variables might have on the 
social judgments of older adults is not yet clear.     
Aging and the Correspondence Bias 
 Prior to the few studies which have been conducted to specifically examine aging 
and the correspondence bias, research on age-related differences in attributional 
reasoning was primarily grounded in the developmental literature on causal attributions 
formed in the context of interpersonal problem situations.  Moreover, age differences in 
causal attributions were often shown to stem from life span changes in the way that adults 
approach social interactions as they grow older.  For example, past studies have 
demonstrated that age-related differences in dispositional biases can be mediated by 
individual differences in the strength of one’s beliefs on certain social “hot button” issues 
(Blanchard-Fields, Chen, Schocke, & Hertzog, 1998; Blanchard-Fields & Hertzog, 2000).  
Additionally, the causal attributions of young and older adults have been shown to be 
differentially impacted by the social context in which causal attributions were drawn 
(Blanchard-Fields, 1994).  More specifically, older adults were found to make more 
extreme dispositional attributions than young adults in the context of interpersonal 
situations with negative outcomes.  Such age-related differences were attenuated, 
however, when older adults were given additional time to make their attributions (Chen 
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& Blanchard-Fields, 1997).  After clearly demonstrating that older adults were more 
susceptible to dispositional biases when forming causal attributions, researchers began to 
explore more mainstream social psychological conceptions of attributional reasoning 
using paradigms that specifically addressed the correspondence bias.     
 As one might expect given their more extreme dispositional tendencies in the 
causal attribution literature, older adults were also more susceptible than young adults to 
the correspondence bias.  In one study (Follett & Hess, 2002), participants were asked to 
judge a target who was instructed to respond on video to questions on a series of political 
issues using a procedure modified from Gilbert and Jones (1986). Some participants were 
told that the target was allowed to answer the questions freely (i.e., choice condition), 
whereas others were told that the target was not free to choose his or her responses to the 
questions (i.e., no-choice condition).  The authors found that older adults were more 
likely than young adults to state that the target’s actual beliefs corresponded with the 
viewpoints that he or she offered in the video.  The authors also suggested that that these 
age-related differences were related to variation in cognitive complexity and cognitive 
ability.  More recent work done by Blanchard-Fields and her colleagues using the Jones 
and Harris attitude-attribution paradigm (1967) has also demonstrated that older adults 
are more susceptible to the correspondence bias than young adults (Horhota & 
Blanchard-Fields, 2002).  In this study, however, age-related differences in the 
correspondence bias were not mediated by performance on a battery of cognitive tests.  
Despite the small differences in the two studies, both studies show that older adults are 
less likely than young adults to attenuate their dispositional attributions when a 
situational constraint is present in the context of an actor’s behavior.              
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Age, Mood, and the Correspondence Bias 
 The goal of this study was to identify the impact that mood has on age-related 
differences in the correspondence bias.  Prior research using the attitude-attribution 
paradigm suggests that, relative to a neutral mood state, being in a positive mood 
increases dispositional biases, whereas being in a negative mood reduces them (Forgas, 
1998).  Furthermore, mood-related differences in the correspondence bias were 
associated with the number of details that could be recalled from the essay presented in 
the attribution task.  Greater recall performance was inferred to be indicative of more 
systematic, effortful processing of the essay’s contents, whereas poor recall was 
associated with more heuristic processing.  Interestingly, other researchers have found 
that mood influences central executive functioning by either positively or negatively 
adjusting the participant’s available processing capacity (Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & 
Williams, 1996; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002).  One obvious question emerges 
from these studies:  Does induced mood impact the attributions of older adults in the 
same way that it influences those of young adults?   
 To begin to answer this question, we first have to turn to literature on emotion and 
emotion regulation to determine whether young and older adults are capable of having 
similar emotional experiences.  Research on age-related differences in emotion suggests 
that young and older adults do not differ in their subjective experience of emotion even 
though older adults show attenuated physiological responses to emotion (Lawton, 2001; 
Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991; Malatesta, Izard, Culver, & Nicholich, 
1987; Tsai, Levenson, & Carstensen, 2000).  Moreover, older adults have been found to 
be equally as susceptible to affect induction as young adults (Fox, Knight, & Zelinski, 
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1998; Phillips, Smith, & Gilhooly, 2002).  When asked to recall the emotions tied to a 
past emotional event older adults recall their emotions as having been more positive than 
do young adults (Levine & Bluck, 1997).  Such an emotion regulation strategy serves as 
further support for the contention that advancing age is related to maintained or improved 
emotional control (Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997; Lawton, 
Kleban, Rajagopal, & Dean, 1992; Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, & Levenson, in press).  
According to Carstensen’s Socio-emotional Selectivity Theory, age-related differences in 
how one recalls emotional events are due to the evolution of our social processing goals 
as we age.  Essentially, Carstensen maintains that as we age - or, more precisely, as we 
get closer and closer to death – the goals that we have for our interactions with others 
shift.  With age, information-gathering is prioritized less, whereas maximizing positive 
perceptions of our own well-being receives more attention (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & 
Charles, 1999).  As a result, when recalling past emotional events, older adults will focus 
on those lessons that they have learned from their experiences rather than on the 
emotional turmoil that may have occurred in their past (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & 
Nesselroade, 2000).   
The portrayal of negative emotions in a more positive light can reduce the 
harmful physiological effects that accompany the stress of reliving these emotions (Gross 
& Levenson, 1993).  Although it can be helpful in maintaining a positive sense of well-
being, the suppression of negative emotions might come at a cost to one’s cognitive 
abilities.  Richards and Gross (2000) have demonstrated that suppressing an outward 
affective response to emotionally arousing situations can act as a cognitive load.  That is, 
in order to actively suppress negative emotions, cognitive resources would be diverted 
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from one’s current focus of attention.  In comparison to young adults, older adults 
normally have a more diminished cognitive capacity (Salthouse, 1991).  This would 
suggest that older adults have fewer cognitive resources to dedicate to emotional 
suppression.  Interestingly, though, older adults are generally believed to be more skilled 
at emotion regulation than young adults.  If older adults are normally more 
dispositionally biased than young adults, what will happen to the attributions of older 
adults if they come into the social judgment task carrying a negative mood?  There are at 
least two possibilities.  If older adults truly strive to maintain an affective balance, they 
may dedicate some of their limited cognitive resources to regulate their emotions.  If this 
is the case, one might expect that the older adults would be even more susceptible to the 
correspondence bias when in a negative mood.  However, given that older adults are 
generally believed to be more efficient at regulating their emotions than young adults, 
mood regulation might operate more automatically for older adults such that mood 
regulation is not so effortful as to influence their attributions.   
One aim of the current study was to identify which of the above possibilities holds 
true in a social judgment situation.  There is some evidence that mood can differentially 
affect the executive functioning of young and older adults (Phillips, Smith, & Gilhooly, 
2002).  For both young and older adults, positive moods led to poorer performance on a 
planning task.  Negative moods, however, led to improved performance for young adults 
and impaired performance for older adults.  Not only did young and older adults display 
opposite patterns of performance on the planning task in response to the negative mood 
condition, but older adults demonstrated much more improvement in their mood state 
immediately after the negative mood induction than did young adults.  The authors 
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suggest that older adults in the negative mood condition were drawing attentional 
resources away from the planning task so that they could devote some of their energy to 
neutralizing their negative mood (Phillips et al., 2002).  This suggestion is consistent with 
Carstensen’s Socio-emotional Selectivity theory.  That is, because older adults prioritize 
the maintenance of a sense of positive well being, they are willing to divert some of their 
cognitive resources away from other less important activities in order to return to a 
baseline positive mood state.   
Given these results, the goal of the current study was to demonstrate that induced 
mood would differentially impact the attributional biases of young and older adults.  
Moreover, we also hoped to find evidence that young and older adults would differ in the 
pattern of affective responses that they provided after the negative mood induction.  The 
current study extended past research on mood and the correspondence bias (Forgas, 
1998) by including assessments of the participants’ confidence in their attitude-
attributions of the target.  As a part of their theory of correspondent inferences, Jones and 
Davis (1965) specifically recommended assessing the correspondence bias using “rating 
scales designed to measure the strength of the attribution to the actor and his confidence 
in making the rating.”  They further posit that, “operationally, correspondence means 
ratings toward the extremes of trait dimensions which are given with confidence.”  More 
recently, it has been suggested that judgmental uncertainty is more clearly reflected by 
the participants’ confidence ratings than by the extremity of their attributions in the 
attitude-attribution paradigm (Devine, 1989).  To remain consistent with past research on 
age-related differences in the correspondence bias, confidence scales were included with 
the primary attitude-attribution questions of interest (Horhota & Blanchard-Fields, 2002).  
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Additionally, the current study extended past research on aging and attributional 
reasoning by examining the possible influence that working memory capacity has on age-





Hypotheses for Study 
1. Age-Related Differences in Attributional Reasoning in the Neutral Condition 
In the neutral condition, older adults will be more dispositionally biased than 
young adults.  This hypothesis is consistent with previous findings (Horhota & 
Blanchard-Fields, 2002).  
2. The Influence of Mood on Attributional Reasoning across the Life Span 
Within the young adult sample and relative to the neutral condition… 
Young adults in the positive mood condition will be more dispositionally biased, 
whereas young adults in the negative mood condition will be less dispositionally 
biased (Forgas, 1998).  
Within the older adult sample and relative to the neutral condition… 
Older adults in both the positive and negative mood conditions will be more 
dispositionally biased.     
3. Age-Related Differences in Essay Recall 
Within the young adult sample and relative to the neutral condition… 
Young adults in the positive mood condition will be less able to recall the content 
of the attribution task’s essay, whereas young adults in the negative mood 
condition will be better able to recall the content of the attribution task’s essay 
(Forgas, 1998).   
Within the older adult sample and relative to the neutral condition… 
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Older adults in both the positive and negative mood conditions will be less able to 
recall the content of the attribution task’s essay.   
4. Age-Related Differences in Emotion Regulation 
Regardless of the mood condition to which they are assigned…  
Young adults will not demonstrate a change in their self-rated mood between the 
affect induction and the end of the experiment (Phillips et al., 2002). 
Within the older adult sample and relative to the neutral condition… 
Older adults in the positive mood condition will not exhibit a change in their self-
rated mood between the affect induction and the end of the experiment, whereas 
older adults in the negative mood condition will evince a positive gain in self-
rated mood across these two measurements. 
5. The Role of Working Memory Capacity in Mood-Related Differences in Attributions 
and Essay Recall     
Within the young adult sample and regardless of the mood condition…  
Working memory capacity measured prior to the mood induction will not 
significantly co-vary with the essay recall and attribution ratings of the young 
adults.  Thus, differences in the attributions and essay recall of the young adults 
will be due to the experimental manipulation of mood.  
Within the older adult sample and relative to the neutral mood condition… 
Although working memory capacity measured prior to the mood induction might 
significantly co-vary with the essay recall and attribution ratings of the older 
adults in the negative mood condition, controlling for individual differences in 
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working memory capacity will not eliminate the effect that negative mood has on 








 Young and older participants first completed general abilities tests and then were 
randomly assigned to one of three mood conditions.  After undergoing a mood induction 
to create a positive, negative, or neutral mood, participants completed a social judgment 
task.  Below is a description of the pilot study that was conducted to develop the 
materials used in the mood induction.  Also described below are the measures that were 
used to examine cognitive and social factors during the study.     
Pilot Study 
 Past research has successfully demonstrated that young and older adults can be 
induced to experience positive and negative mood states (Fox, Knight, & Zelinski, 1998; 
Phillips et al., 2002).  Although Forgas (1998) had used a success-failure manipulation to 
induce positive and negative mood in young adults to study the correspondence bias, this 
study employed a more passive approach to inducing mood.  Because short film clips 
have been shown to be able to temporarily alter the mood state of young and older 
participants, the film clip approach was adopted in this study.  By favoring this approach 
over a success-failure manipulation, it was possible for experimenters to avoid deceiving 
the participants.  To ensure the effectiveness of the potential materials to be used in the 
mood induction, participants viewed nine different film clips (four positive, two negative, 
and three neutral), ranging in length from 8 to 13 minutes.  After each clip, participants 
used six bipolar 7-point rating scales to indicate the degree to which the film clip was 
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sad-happy, calming-arousing, uplifting-depressing, boring-exciting, amusing-serious, and 
aggravating-relaxing.  Participants also used a 5-point rating scale (1 = not at all to 5 = 
extremely) to indicate the degree to which each film clip led them to feel 19 different 
emotions (Events and Emotions Questionnaire; Kennedy, Carstensen, & Pasupathi, 
1999): anger, guilt, pride, sadness, happiness, fear, accomplishment, shame, amusement, 
anxiety, joy, contentment, irritation, frustration, disgust, interest, embarrassment, 
boredom, and excitement. 
 In total, 32 participants viewed the nine short film segments: 15 young adults (7 
women and 8 men; age range: 19-23) and 17 older adults (8 women and 9 men; age 
range: 60-79).  Of the nine clips, five were chosen for further testing (two positive, one 
negative, and two neutral films).  These five films were later narrowed down to three: a 
film describing the development of the personal computer in the modern world (neutral 
condition film), a film in which a mother must choose to abandon one of her two children 
in a concentration camp during World War II (negative condition film), and a film in 
which an actor fidgets and distracts himself during a church service (positive condition 
film).  When examining the bipolar 7-point happiness-sadness rating scale, both young 
and older adults reported that the positive condition film produced significantly more 
happiness (M = 5.66, SE = 0.18) than did the neutral condition film (M = 4.13, SE = 
0.07).  Additionally, the negative condition film was reported to produce significantly 
less happiness (M = 1.25, SE = 0.17) in both young and older adults than did the neutral 
condition film.  Similar results were found when examining the bipolar 7-point uplifting-
depressing rating scale (positive condition film M = 2.84, SE = 0.20; neutral condition 
film M = 3.56, SE = 0.17; negative condition film M = 6.44, SE = 0.20).  Comparisons 
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between the positive, negative, and neutral condition films using the additional 19-item 
emotion inventory were consistent with the above comparisons within each age group.  
The three films chosen from the pilot study were those that successfully produced the 
intended mood and did so equally well for young and older adults.     
Participants 
 Two hundred and forty-nine individuals were recruited from a southeastern 
metropolitan region for this study: 121 young adults (YA; age range: 45.5% women; 18-
30; M = 20.57, SD = 1.81) and 128 older adults (OA; 60.2% women; age range: 56-80; 
M = 69.33, SD = 5.93).  Most of the participants were Caucasian (77.9%; African-
American = 10.8%, Asian = 5.6%, and Other = 5.7%) and identified themselves as 
Christians (75.5%; Jewish = 4.4%, Other = 10.1%, None = 10.0%).  On average, young 
and older adults reported having relatively the same level of education (i.e., some 
college).  Young adults, however, rated their health as being significantly better than that 
of older adults (p < .05; 1 = poor to 5 = excellent; YA M = 3.98, SE = 0.08; OA M = 
3.54, SE = 0.09).  Older adults also reported that health problems were more likely to 
keep them from participating in activities than did the young adults (p < .05; 1 = not at all 
to 4 = a great deal; YA M = 1.20, SE = 0.05; OA M = 1.67, SE = 0.07).   
 After excluding those who did not meet the criteria that were necessary to be 
included in the final analyses of the data set, only 165 participants remained.  A total of 
84 participants were excluded for the following reasons: did not meet criteria of 
screening measures (n = 15), ineffective mood manipulation (n = 26), change in the 
experiment’s materials (n = 14), failed manipulation check in the attitude-attribution task 
(n = 26), and experimenter error (n = 3).  Elaborated explanations of these exclusions are 
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provided in the results and in the description of the materials used in this study.  The 
remaining young (n = 85; 44.7% women; age range: 18-28; M = 20.49; SD = 1.75) and 
older (n = 80; 56.3% women; age range: 60-80; M = 68.62; SD = 5.89) participants did 
not differ in education level or in health from those young and older participants who 
were excluded.  Additionally, the remaining young adults outperformed the remaining 
older adults on the reading span test of working memory (YA M = 6.72, SD = 2.16; OA 
M = 4.18, SD = 2.22; t(163) = 7.46, p < .001).  The opposite pattern was found for the 
young and older adults’ vocabulary scores, with the older adults outperforming the young 
adults (YA M = 17.53, SD = 4.30; OA M = 21.64, SD = 7.33; t(163) = -4.42, p < .001). 
Materials 
 Vocabulary.  The ETS Vocabulary Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 
1976) was used to assess verbal ability.  For each item, participants chose the best match 
to a target word from four possible responses.  Participants were allowed four minutes to 
complete each 18-item half of the test.  Each participant’s vocabulary score is equivalent 
to the number of correct responses.  Those participants who fail to answer at least five 
items correctly were screened from the study.   
 Working Memory.  The reading span task was used to assess working memory 
(Engle, 2003).  During this task, participants were required to read a series of sentences.  
For each sentence, the participant had to read the sentence aloud, indicate whether or not 
the sentence seemed meaningful, and then read the letter that followed each sentence 
aloud.  Participants were asked to try to remember as many of the letters as possible for a 
later test.  The set size ranged from two to five letters.  Each participant’s score is the 
number of sets of letters that were correctly recalled (i.e., content and order of letters 
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correct).  Those participants who failed to correctly recall at least one set of letters were 
screened from the study. 
 Attitude-Attribution Essay Task.  In most examinations of the correspondence 
bias, participants are randomly assigned to one of two target constraint conditions.  More 
specifically, participants are either assigned (a) to a condition where they are told that the 
target was free to choose the direction of his or her essay (i.e., the “choice” condition), or 
(b) to a condition where they are told that the target was assigned to take a particular 
stance (i.e., the “no-choice” condition) when writing the essay (Jones & Harris, 1967).  In 
this study, all of the participants were told that the target was not free to choose the 
position that he or she would endorse when writing the essay.  Participants also were 
randomly assigned one of two essays to read: essay in favor of capital punishment or 
essay opposed to capital punishment.  The instructions to the target and the essays written 
by the target can be found in Appendix A.  These essays were equated on the length and 
strength of the arguments.   
 After reading the instructions to the target and after reading the target’s essay, 
participants were asked to complete a series of ratings.  Among the items rated by the 
participants on this essay questionnaire were (1) the author’s attitude towards capital 
punishment (rating scale for all attitude-attributions: 1 = very much opposed to capital 
punishment to 4 = neither in favor nor opposed (neutral) to 7 = very much in favor of 
capital punishment), (2) the participant’s certainty (confidence) in the rating of the 
author’s attitude (1 = not at all certain to 5 = extremely certain), (3) the participant’s own 
attitude towards capital punishment, (4) the attitude of the “average person” towards 
capital punishment, (5) the position that the writer was expected to endorse (manipulation 
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check of the constraint on the target: 1 = in favor of capital punishment, 2 = opposed to 
capital punishment, 3 = neither in favor nor opposed), (6) the position endorsed by the 
essay (same rating scale as the attitude-attributions), and (7) the extent to which the 
position in the essay was well-defended (essay quality: 1 = very poorly defended to 3 = 
neither poorly nor well defended to 5 = very well defended).   
 It is important to note that participants were excluded from the study if they failed 
to provide the correct answer to the manipulation check of the constraint on the target.  
This question tests each participant’s awareness of the constraint on the target’s behavior.  
For example, if a participant was assigned to the condition in which the target was 
instructed to write an essay ‘in favor of’ capital punishment, a correct response by the 
participant would reflect his or her awareness of this fact (i.e., participant response: “1 = 
in favor of capital punishment”).  Those participants who were not aware of the 
constraint placed on the target by the instructions had nothing upon which to base a 
correction of their initial dispositional attributions of the target’s attitude and were thus 
excluded.        
 Essay recall.  Upon completing the attitude-attribution essay task, the participants 
were asked to recall as much of the essay as possible.  Each participant’s score is equal to 
the number of idea fragments recalled.  Participants’ responses were qualitatively coded 
independently by two research assistants (α for YA = 94.9%; α for OA = 95.1%).  As is 
displayed in Appendix B, each essay was divided into eight idea fragments.  Participants 
were said to have recalled a fragment if they recalled the main point (or gist) of the 
fragment.   
19 
 Mood Induction.  Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three mood 
conditions: happy, neutral, or sad.  Affect was induced in this study by having the 
participants watch a short film clip.  After each film clip, a mood congruent musical piece 
was played to sustain the emotions that were experienced while viewing the film clip.  
The musical pieces (positive: Vivaldi’s The Four Seasons, Spring Allegro; negative: 
Albinoni’s Adagio; neutral: Bach’s Sonata for violin Nos. 1 or 2) were selected on their 
ability to successfully induce affect in past research (Fox, Knight, & Zelinski, 1998; 
Knight, Maines, & Robinson, 2002).  The film clips used in the mood induction were the 
three described above in the pilot study. 
 Mood Assessment.  Mood was assessed at several key points during the study 
using 20 emotion adjectives from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and six additional emotion adjectives (happy, 
contented, amused, sad, frustrated, and disgusted) taken from the Events and Emotions 
Questionnaire (Kennedy, Carstensen, & Pasupathi, 1999).  Participants were asked to rate 
the extent to which each adjective described how they were currently feeling (1 = very 
slightly or not at all to 5 = extremely) at four different time points: immediately prior to 
the mood induction (Time 1), after the mood induction and just prior to the first 
administration of the attitude-attribution essay task (Time 2), immediately after the 
attitude-attribution essay task and before the essay recall task (Time 3), and after the 
second administration of the attitude-attribution essay task (Time 4).  In previous 
research, the mood state of the participants was tracked using the difference between the 
aggregates of the positive and negative affect adjectives (Phillips, Smith, & Gilhooly, 
2002) and by using a single item sadness-happiness scale (Forgas, 1998).  For this study, 
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one’s mood state was determined by examining both the positive and negative affect 
aggregates separately and by examining the participants’ ratings on the six other emotion 
adjectives.  Those participants who did not display affect that was consistent with their 
assigned mood states were excluded from the study.  The criteria used to determine these 
exclusions will be discussed below in the results section.        
Procedure 
 Participants were greeted by the experimenter when they arrived to the laboratory, 
and they were directed to an individual testing room.  Participants were run through the 
entire experiment one at a time.  After informed consent was obtained, each participant 
was told that this study was part of a program of research that examined attitudes and 
styles of social reasoning.  Participants were also told that the study consisted of three 
parts.  In the first part, participants completed the vocabulary and reading span tasks.  
Participants also completed a short mouse tutorial designed to familiarize them with the 
functions of the computer mouse during the study.  Participants next completed the first 
mood assessment (Time 1) at their own pace using the computer and mouse.  In the 
second part of the experiment, each participant viewed the short film clip for the mood 
condition to which he or she was assigned.  After the clip, participants were informed that 
they would be moving on to the final part of the study, and the appropriate musical piece 
was turned on in the background.  The participants were instructed that they would first 
complete a second questionnaire on their emotions (Time 2 mood assessment) and that 
after this they would complete the attitude-attribution essay task that was mentioned in 
the consent form and in the study’s introduction.   After the essay task, participants 
completed a third mood assessment (Time 3).  Next, participants were given a lined sheet 
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of paper and were asked to write down as much of the essay from the essay task as they 
could recall.  Both young and older participants required approximately five minutes for 
the essay recall task.  Once the participants were finished with the essay recall task, they 
repeated the attitude-attribution essay task (again at their own pace) and completed one 
last mood assessment (Time 4).  Immediately after the final mood assessment, 
participants were given a second lined sheet of paper and were told to take a few minutes 
to write down those things that they might have been thinking about during the course of  
 
Table 1. Sequence of Tasks and Experimental Manipulations 
 
 
1. Informed Consent 
2. ETS Vocabulary test 
3. Reading Span Task 
4. Mouse tutorial 
5. Time 1 mood assessment 
6. Mood induction film clip shown 
7. Mood induction musical piece started 
8. Time 2 mood assessment 
9. First Attitude-Attribution Essay task 
10. Time 3 mood assessment 
11. Essay recall task 
12. Second Attitude-Attribution Essay task 
13. Time 4 mood assessment 
14. Thought-listing task 
15. Mood induction musical piece played 
16. Demographics form 
17. Participant Debriefing 
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the experiment.  Finally, the background music was turned off and participants filled out 
a demographics questionnaire.  Table 1 displays the order of tasks for each session.  On 
average, this entire procedure required 90 minutes to complete.  Participants were 
thoroughly debriefed after the session.  Older participants received a small honorarium 
for their participation, and young adults were awarded educational credit to apply 








 This study has a 2 (age group: young and older adults) by 2 (gender: men and 
women) by 3 (mood condition: neutral, positive, and negative) by 2 (essay direction: ‘in 
favor of’ and ‘opposed to’ capital punishment) between-subjects design.  Because no 
main effects or interactions involving the gender or essay direction variables were found, 
these variables were excluded from the below analyses.  Unless otherwise stated, all of 
the statistical tests reported below use an α = .05 level for hypothesis testing.  
Additionally, when a hypothesis involves a directional prediction, one-tailed hypothesis 
tests were used. 
Mood Validation 
 Of the 249 individuals who participated in this experiment, 84 participants were 
excluded for those reasons described previously.  As a part of these exclusions, 26 
participants (12 young and 14 older adults) were excluded for not demonstrating the 
appropriate mood in the positive and negative mood conditions.  In other words, criteria 
were established to identify those individuals for which the mood induction was 
successful in creating the experimentally desired mood state.  More specifically, 
participants were excluded from the positive mood condition if they did not rate their 
happiness at a level of 3 (moderately happy) or higher during the mood assessment 
immediately after the mood induction (i.e., Time 2).  Similarly, participants were 
excluded from the negative mood condition if they did not rate their happiness at a level 
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below 3 during the second mood assessment.  Because the neutral mood condition was 
supposed to replicate the average mood state experienced in an experimental setting, 
participants were not excluded from the neutral mood condition on the basis of their 
affect ratings.  Happiness was chosen from the 26 emotional adjectives as the key to 
establishing the above exclusion criteria because it was the only adjective for which the 
young and older participants did not differ after the mood induction within each mood 
condition. 
 Happiness Ratings.  A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) evaluating the 
effects of mood condition and age group on the participants’ happiness ratings 
immediately after the mood induction demonstrated a significant effect of mood, 
F(2,159) = 88.15.  Figure 1 displays the mean happiness for young and older participants 
at each of the four assessment time points within each mood condition.  A contrast 
between the neutral and positive mood conditions revealed that time 2 happiness ratings 
were greater in the positive condition (M = 3.73, SD = 0.67) than in the neutral (M = 
3.22, SD = 1.16), t(118) = 2.91.  Additionally, a contrast between the neutral and 
negative mood conditions revealed that time 2 happiness ratings were lower in the 
negative condition (M = 1.51, SD = 0.51) than in the neutral, t(107) = 9.26.  These 
findings provide evidence that the happiness ratings of the three experimental mood 
conditions differed at time 2. 
 Within the neutral condition, happiness ratings did not demonstrate a significant 
change between the pre- and post- mood induction assessments (Time 1: M = 3.41, SD = 
0.97; Time 2: M = 3.22, SD = 1.16).  Within the positive condition, the happiness ratings 
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Figure 1. Happiness Ratings of Young and Older Adults Separated by Mood Condition.
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SD = 0.71), t(55) = 2.01.  Within the negative condition, the happiness ratings at time 2 
(M = 1.51, SD = 0.51) were significantly lower than those at time 1 (M = 3.13, SD = 
0.89), t(44) = 10.36.  These findings provide evidence that the mood induction led to the 
desired experimental changes in affect within each mood condition. 
 Sadness Ratings.  Figure 2 displays the mean sadness ratings for young and older 
participants at each of the four assessment time points within each mood condition. A 
two-way ANOVA evaluating the effects of mood condition and age group on the 
participants’ time 2 sadness ratings revealed significant main effects of age and mood 
qualified by a mood by age group interaction, F(2,159) = 6.60.  Additional contrasts 
revealed that this interaction was driven by higher time 2 sadness ratings of those 
individuals in the negative condition (neutral mood condition: M = 1.14, SE = 0.04; 
positive mood condition: M = 1.11, SE = 0.04; negative mood condition: M = 3.02, SE = 
0.20).  Within the negative mood condition, older adults (M = 3.50, SD = 1.40) were 
significantly more sad at time 2 than the young adults (M = 2.64, SD = 1.15), t(43) = 
2.27.  These findings provide additional evidence for the effectiveness of the mood 
induction, especially for those participants in the negative mood condition. 
 Within the neutral condition, neither young nor older adults demonstrated 
significant change in their sadness ratings from immediately before to immediately after 
the mood induction.  Young adults assigned to the positive condition did demonstrate a 
significant decline in sadness from time 1 to time 2, t(27) = 2.71, but the mean sadness 
rating never rose above 1.50 (on a scale from 1 to 5).  Older adults in the positive 
condition did not rate their sadness differently between times 1 and 2.  Within the 
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Figure 2. Sadness Ratings of Young and Older Adults Separated by Mood Condition.
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sadness ratings between time 1 and time 2, t(24) = 5.56 and t(19) = 6.49, respectively 
(young Time 1: M = 1.44, SD = 0.77; young Time 2: M = 2.64, SD = 1.15; older Time 1: 
M = 1.25, SD = 0.55; older Time 2: M = 3.50, SD = 1.40). 
 Summary of Affect Ratings.  As was demonstrated by both the happiness and 
sadness ratings of the young and older adults above, the mood induction technique used 
in this experiment was successful in effectively manipulating the participants’ mood.  
Relative to the ratings of those participants in the neutral mood condition, young and 
older adults in the positive mood condition exhibited higher happiness and lower sadness 
ratings immediately after viewing the positive film clip.  Also relative to the ratings of 
those participants in the neutral mood condition, young and older adults in the negative 
mood condition exhibited lower happiness and higher sadness ratings immediately after 
the viewing the negative film clip.         
Attitude-Attribution Task 
 As has been done in previous research, attitude-attribution ratings of the target’s 
attitude towards capital punishment were recoded to express the extremity of the 
participants’ attributions (Horhota & Blanchard-Fields, 2002).  To do this, four (i.e., the 
neutral anchor) was subtracted from each attitude-attribution rating, and the absolute 
value of this figure was then calculated (e.g., attitude-attribution = 6; extremity score = |6 
– 4| = 2).  For the resulting extremity scores, lower scores indicate neutral or less biased 
ratings, whereas higher (or extreme) scores signal biased attributions.  The results of this 
study did not change when the attitude-attribution ratings were recoded using a 7-point 
scale which was similar to the original ratings but which instead reflected a rating of the 
degree to which the target’s beliefs correspond with the assigned essay position (i.e., 1 = 
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target’s beliefs are in the completely opposite direction as the assigned essay position to 7 
= target’s beliefs are completely correspondent with the assigned essay position).   
 In addition to the attitude-attribution extremity ratings, the participants’ ratings of 
their confidence in their attitude-attributions were also examined.  Because Forgas’s 1998 
study on mood and the correspondence bias did not include such confidence ratings, no 
specific hypotheses were made regarding the participants’ confidence ratings.  Past 
research on attributional reasoning in young adults suggests that the patterns of results 
found with confidence ratings should mirror those which are found for the attitude-
attributions (Devine, 1989).  More specifically, experimental manipulations that lead to 
less extreme attributions should lead to reduced confidence, and manipulations that lead 
to more extreme attributions should lead to increased confidence.  Assessing the 
participants’ confidence ratings is an important part of investigating the correspondence 
bias.  Given the strong demand on participants to consider the essay to be diagnostic of 
the target’s attitude, it comes as no surprise that the correspondence bias emerges even 
when the target’s behavior is dictated by external factors.  Consequently, extreme 
attitude-attributions that are made with reduced confidence may also be indicative of less 
correspondent inferences on the part of the participant (Miller et al., 1984), and they are 
interpreted as such in the current study.  Extremity scores and confidence ratings are 
displayed in Figures 3 and 4. 
Results for Hypotheses               
 Hypothesis #1 – Age-Related Differences in the Correspondence Bias.  The goal 
of hypothesis #1 was to replicate the findings of past research on age-related differences 
in the correspondence bias by demonstrating that older adults were more extreme in their  
30 
Extremity Ratings by 
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Figure 3.  Attitude-Attribution Extremity Ratings for Young and Older Adults by Mood 
Condition. 
 
attributions than young adults (Horhota & Blanchard-Fields, 2002).  In order to test this 
hypothesis, the extremity scores of young and older adults in the neutral mood condition 
were compared.  This t-test confirmed our predictions by showing that the older adults’ 
ratings of the target’s attitude (M = 2.50, SD = 0.80) were significantly more extreme 
than the ratings of the young adults (M = 2.13, SD = 0.87), t(62) = 1.79.  In addition to 
the t-test comparing the extremity scores of young and older adults in the neutral mood 
condition, a second t-test was conducted to examine age-related differences in their 
confidence ratings.  Based on past research, we were expecting older adults to be more 
confident in their attributions than young adults.  Again our predictions were confirmed.  
Older adults in the neutral mood condition (M = 3.53, SD = 1.34) were more confident 
than the neutral young adults (M = 2.91, SD = 0.96), t(62) = 2.14.   
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Figure 4.  Confidence Ratings for Young and Older Adults by Mood Condition 
 
 Hypothesis #1 – Summary.  Overall, our results for hypothesis #1 were consistent 
with past research on age-related differences in the correspondence bias (Horhota & 
Blanchard-Fields, 2002).  Older adults were more susceptible to the correspondence bias 
than young adults.  
         Hypothesis #2 – Mood’s Influence on Attributions.  For hypothesis #2, it was 
predicted that the mood induction would differentially impact the extremity scores of 
young and older adults.  In order to test hypothesis #2, a series of planned comparisons 
were conducted (1) within each age group between the mood conditions, and (2) within 
each mood condition between the age groups.   
 The comparisons within each age group between the mood conditions will be 
described first.  These comparisons contrasted the extremity scores of those participants 
in the neutral mood condition (a) with those in the positive mood condition, and (b) with 
those in the negative mood condition.  Within each age group, none of the planned 
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comparisons demonstrated significant effects.  Moreover, the dispositional attributions of 
young adults specifically did not display the mood-related effects found in past research 
on mood and the correspondence bias (Forgas, 1998).  Consequently, hypothesis #2 was 
not supported by the young adults’ attitude-attribution data.   
 Given that past research has demonstrated that positive and negative mood states 
can have entirely opposite effects on the attributions of young adult participants (Forgas, 
1998), additional comparisons were conducted between these extreme mood conditions.  
This time, for each age group, the attitude-attribution extremity ratings of those in the 
positive and negative mood conditions were compared.  Although the extremity scores of 
young adults in the positive and negative mood conditions did not differ (young positive: 
M = 2.07, SE = 0.17; young negative: M = 1.96, SE = 0.14), there was a trend for the 
older adults in the positive mood condition (M = 2.18, SE = 0.19) to rate the target’s 
attitude as less extreme than those older adults in the negative mood condition (M = 2.60, 
SE = 0.17), t(46) = 1.61, p = .11.  Although not originally predicted in hypothesis #2, 
older adults provided more extreme attributions in the negative mood condition than in 
the positive mood condition.   
 Now that we have explored mood’s impact on attributions within each age group, 
we can turn to describing the impact that age had on attributions within each mood 
condition.  Although the age group by mood condition interaction was not significant in 
the omnibus ANOVA conducted above, we were curious to see if the main effect of age 
on the extremity scores held within each mood condition.  In order to examine age-
related differences in the correspondence bias within each mood condition, t-tests were 
conducted to compare the extremity scores of young and older adults in the neutral, 
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positive, and negative mood conditions.  As described for hypothesis #1, older adults in 
the neutral mood condition provided more extreme attributions than young adults.  In the 
positive mood condition, young and older adults did not differ in the extremity of their 
attribution ratings (young: M = 2.07, SD = 0.90; older: M = 2.18, SD = 0.98), t(54) = 
0.43.  In the negative mood condition, older adults (M = 2.60, SD = 0.75) again were 
more extreme in their attributions than were the young adults (M = 1.96, SD = 0.68), 
t(43) = 3.00.  Although older adults exhibited more extreme attributions than young 
adults in the neutral and negative mood conditions, young and older adults in the positive 
mood condition did not differ in the degree to which they were susceptible to the 
correspondence bias.  Interestingly, the positive mood induction ameliorated age-related 
differences in the correspondence bias for older adults.             
 Hypothesis #2 – Mood’s Influence on Confidence Ratings.  Although no 
predictions were made with respect to the participants’ confidence ratings in hypothesis 
#2, one would ultimately expect the participants’ confidence ratings here to be influenced 
in a manner similar to the attitude-attributions of the young adults in Forgas’s study 
(1998).  More specifically, relative to the neutral mood, the positive mood condition 
should lead young adults to be more confident and the negative mood condition should 
lead young adults to be less confident.  In light of our results thus far for older adults, 
relative to the neutral mood condition, the positive mood condition should lead older 
adults to be less confident and the negative mood condition should lead older adults to be 
more confident.  Because we did not specifically predict the above effects in hypothesis 
#2, a preliminary ANOVA was conducted to examine the influence that age group and 
mood condition had on confidence ratings.  This test revealed that a significant effect of 
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age group, F(1,159) = 15.38, was qualified by an age group by mood interaction, 
F(2,159) = 4.46.  Although older adults (M = 3.54, SD = 1.22) were generally more 
confident than young adults (M = 2.93, SD = 0.92), this age-related difference varied by 
mood condition.  Contrasts were conducted to examine (a) mood-related differences 
within each age group, and (b) age-related differences within each mood condition.   
 We began our decomposition of the age group by mood condition interaction by 
conducting contrasts to investigate the impact of mood on confidence within each age 
group.  Because comparisons of each the positive and negative mood conditions with the 
neutral mood condition did not yield any significant results, additional within-age group 
comparisons were conducted between the positive and negative mood conditions.  
Interestingly, young and older adults exhibited exactly the opposite patterns of means in 
the comparisons.  Whereas young adults in the positive mood condition (M = 3.21, SD = 
0.79) were more confident in their attributions than those in the negative mood condition 
(M = 2.64, SD = 0.95), t(51) = 2.40, older adults in the positive mood condition (M = 
3.25, SD = 1.11) were less confident in their attributions than those in the negative mood 
condition (M = 3.95, SD = 1.10), t(46) = 2.16.  These results suggest that induced 
positive and negative moods had the opposite effect on the confidence ratings of young 
and older adults.  Again, this interpretation of the results discounts the lack of significant 
differences when comparing the confidence ratings of each the positive and negative 
mood conditions to the neutral mood condition. 
 Contrasts were then conducted within each mood condition to compare the 
confidence ratings of young and older adults.  In the neutral mood condition, older adults 
(M = 3.53, SD = 1.34) were more confident than young adults (M = 2.91, SD = 0.96), 
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t(62) = 2.14.  This age-related difference was amplified in the negative mood condition in 
which older adults (M = 3.95, SD = 1.10) were again more confident than their younger 
counterparts (M = 2.64, SD = 0.95), t(43) = 4.28.  In the positive mood condition, the 
effect of age disappears; young and older adults demonstrated equivalent confidence 
ratings (young: M = 3.21, SD = 0.79; older: M = 3.25, SD = 1.11).  As was the case with 
the extremity scores, age-related differences emerged when comparing the confidence of 
young and older adults in the neutral and negative mood conditions, but, no age-related 
differences emerged in the positive mood condition.   
 Hypothesis #2 – Summary.  Although the attributional data does not support a 
clear interaction between age group and mood condition, a more specific investigation of 
age-related differences within each mood condition did uncover an interesting finding.  
Although age-related differences appeared in the extremity scores of participants in the 
negative and neutral mood conditions, they did not appear in the extremity scores of 
those in the positive mood condition. 
 Inasmuch as the participants’ confidence ratings can also be thought of as an 
indicator of ones susceptibility to the correspondence bias (Devine, 1989), a clear pattern 
of findings emerged.  The results for the confidence ratings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that mood differentially influenced the susceptibility of young and older 
adults to the correspondence bias.  Young adults in the positive mood condition believed 
more strongly than those young adults in the negative mood condition that their 
correspondent assessment of the target’s beliefs was accurate.  On the other hand, older 
adults in the positive mood condition believed less strongly than those older adults in the 
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negative mood condition that their correspondent assessment of the target’s beliefs was 
accurate.    
 Hypothesis #3 – Mood’s Influence on Essay Recall.  For hypothesis #3, it was 
predicted that the mood induction would differentially impact the amount of the essay 
that young and older adults would recall.  Based on previous findings, we predicted that 
positive moods would lead young adults to more heuristically examine the essay and the 
instructions to the target.  As a result, young adults in the positive mood condition were 
expected to recall less of the essay than young adults in the neutral condition.  On the 
other hand, negative moods were expected to lead young adults to engage in more 
effortful processing of the essay and the instructions to the author.  Consequently, we 
expected young adults in the negative mood condition to recall more than young adults in 
the neutral mood condition.  For the older adult sample, we were expecting both the 
positive and negative mood conditions to lead older adults to less carefully process the 
instructions to the target and the contents of the essay.  In order to examine hypothesis 
#3, an ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect that age group and mood condition 
had on essay recall.   Because preliminary analyses identified that baseline (pre-mood 
induction) working memory performance marginally differed between the positive and 
negative mood conditions, reading span performance was included as a covariate in the 
ANOVA.  An effect of age group was the only significant effect that emerged; young 
adults (M = 4.87, SD = 0.13) recalled more of the essay than older adults (M = 3.65, SD 
= 0.18), F(1,158) = 14.96.  Additionally, reading span was not a significant covariate of 
essay recall performance.     
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 Hypothesis #3-Summary.  Given the above, the results of this study did not 
support our predictions for hypothesis #3.  Analyses of the young adults’ essay recall 
performance did not replicate findings from past research on the influence of mood on the 
correspondence bias (Forgas, 1998).  In fact, mood did not impact the recall performance 
of young and older adults in any way.                
 Hypothesis #4 – Within Age Group Change in Affect Ratings over Time.  This 
hypothesis predicted that young adult participants would not demonstrate a significant 
change in their affect after the mood induction.  Older adults were, however, 
hypothesized to display a significant change in their affect after the mood induction.  
More specifically, the affect of older adults in the negative condition was hypothesized to 
change more than the older adults in the positive and neutral mood conditions.  Within 
each age group, a mixed model ANOVA was conducted to examine the impact of mood 
condition and time of mood assessment on happiness ratings.  Mood condition was 
entered as a between-subjects factor, and time of assessment was entered as a within-
subjects factor with two levels (Time 2 and Time 3).   
 For the young adults, a main effect of mood condition, F(2,82) = 30.54, was 
qualified by an interaction between mood condition and time of assessment, F(2,82) = 
10.06.  Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to identify the source of this interaction.  
The happiness ratings of young adults in the neutral mood condition did not change 
between time 2 (M = 3.09, SD = 1.12) and time 3 (M = 2.84, SD = 1.10).  In the positive 
mood condition, the happiness ratings of young adults declined between time 2 (M = 
3.64, SD = 0.56) and time 3 (M = 3.11, SD = 0.83), t(27) = 3.81.  The happiness ratings 
of young adults in the negative condition improved between time 2 (M = 1.60, SD = 
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0.50) and time 3 (M = 1.96, SD = 0.61), t(24) = 2.82.  These results do not support 
hypothesis #4; young adults did experience some change in mood after the mood 
induction. 
 For the older adults, a main effect of mood condition, F(2,77) = 23.91, was 
qualified by an expected interaction between mood condition and time of assessment, 
F(2,77) = 11.68.  Once again, paired-samples t-tests were conducted to identify the 
source of this interaction.  As expected, the happiness ratings of older adults in the 
neutral mood condition did not change between time 2 (M = 3.34, SD = 1.21) and time 3 
(M = 3.19, SD = 1.26).  Unexpectedly, in the positive mood condition, the happiness 
ratings of older adults declined between time 2 (M = 3.82, SD = 0.77) and time 3 (M = 
3.32, SD = 0.95), t(27) = 2.75 .  As was expected, the happiness ratings of older adults in 
the negative mood condition were greater at time 3 (M = 2.30, SD = 1.08) than at time 2 
(M = 1.40, SD = 0.50), t(19) = 3.94.  In summary, unexpectedly young and older adults 
displayed the same pattern of change in their happiness ratings between time 2 and time 
3.  The happiness ratings of participants in the positive mood condition declined after the 
mood induction, whereas the happiness ratings of the participants in the negative mood 
condition increased.  In the neutral mood condition, neither age group exhibited change 
in their mood after the mood induction.   
 When the participants’ time 2 and time 3 sadness ratings were examined, the only 
noticeable change occurred in the negative mood condition for both age groups.  Both 
young and older adults demonstrated higher sadness ratings at time 2 than at time 3, t(24) 
= 5.63 and t(19) = 5.53, respectively (young sad time 2: M = 2.64, SD = 1.15; young sad 
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time 3: M = 1.76, SD = 0.83; older sad time 2: M = 3.50, SD = 1.40; older sad time 3: M 
= 1.65, SD = 0.93).              
 Hypothesis #4 – Between Age Group Change in Affect over Time.  Contrary to 
our expectations, both young and older adults demonstrated some change in mood 
between time 2 and time 3.  Consequently, two additional mixed model ANOVAs were 
conducted to determine if there were age-related differences in the patterns of the 
happiness and sadness ratings between time 2 and time 3.  To assess potential age-related 
differences in change in these affect ratings, age group was added as a second between-
subjects factor to the mixed model ANOVAs conducted earlier.  The mixed model 
ANOVA for the happiness ratings is described first, followed by that for the sadness 
ratings.   
 For the happiness ratings, a main effect of mood condition, F(2,159) = 53.65, was 
qualified by an interaction between mood condition and time of assessment, F(2,159) = 
21.91.  No effects involving age group emerged.  That is, young and older adults 
demonstrated the same pattern of change in happiness ratings between time 2 and time 3 
within each mood condition.      
 For the sadness ratings, significant main effects of mood condition, F(2,159) = 
74.73, and time of assessment, F(1,159) = 58.58, were qualified by a three-way 
interaction between age group, mood condition, and time of assessment, F(2,159) = 6.63.  
Ultimately, the three-way interaction emerged because of the sadness ratings of those 
participants in the negative mood condition.  The sadness ratings for these individuals 
were higher at time 2 and time 3 than for those individuals in the positive and neutral 
conditions.  Moreover, young and older adults in the negative condition did not 
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demonstrate equivalent change in sadness between times 2 and time 3.  To specifically 
target the time 2 and time 3 sadness ratings of the participants in the negative mood 
condition, a mixed model ANOVA was conducted to determine the effects of age group 
and time of assessment on these ratings.  The analysis yielded a significant interaction 
between age group and time of assessment, F(1,43) = 7.86.  Older adults (M = 3.50, SE = 
0.31) experienced significantly more sadness than did young adults (M = 2.64, SE = 
0.23) at time 2, but young adults (M = 1.76, SE = 0.17) and older adults (M = 1.65, SE = 
0.21) did not differ in their sadness at time 3.  Furthermore, older adults experienced a 
larger improvement in mood between time 2 and time 3. 
 Hypothesis #4 – Summary.  The results described above partially support the 
predictions that were made for this hypothesis.  Unexpectedly, young adults 
demonstrated change in both their happiness and sadness ratings between times 2 and 3.  
Also unexpectedly, young and older adults demonstrated exactly the same pattern of 
change in happiness between time 2 and time 3.  Immediately after the negative mood 
induction, young and older adults both started to improve in their happiness ratings.  
After the positive mood induction (i.e., between time 2 and time 3), however, both young 
and older adults started to decline in happiness.  Although young and older adults also 
unexpectedly demonstrated a similar pattern of change in sadness ratings in the negative 
mood condition, the sadness ratings of older adults did lessen more than those of young 
adults.  This difference was accounted for by the older adults’ higher sadness ratings in 
response to the negative mood induction (at time 2) relative to the young adults’ sadness 
ratings.            
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 Hypothesis #5 – Mood-Related Differences in Attributions and Confidence 
Controlling for Baseline Cognitive Performance.  For hypothesis #5, we predicted that 
controlling for individual differences in baseline working memory capacity would not 
eliminate mood-related differences in essay recall performance or in attitude-attribution 
extremity scores.  Because essay recall and the attitude-attribution extremity scores were 
not found to vary by mood condition as originally specified in hypothesis #2 for either 
age group, direct tests of hypothesis #5 could not be carried out.  Instead, ANOVAs were 
conducted for each age group to examine the impact of mood condition on the 
participants’ confidence in their ratings of the target’s attitude towards capital 
punishment.  Again, we would expect that the same predictions that were made for the 
attitude-attributions would hold for the participants’ confidence ratings.  In other words, 
for young adults, mood-related differences in confidence should not be eliminated by 
controlling for baseline working memory performance.  For older adults, although 
working memory capacity could be a significant covariate of attributional confidence, 
mood-related differences in confidence should remain after controlling for individual 
differences in baseline working memory performance.   
 For these analyses, only the positive and negative conditions were included as 
levels of the between-subjects mood condition factor.  Additionally, reading span 
performance was used as a covariate.  For young adults, individuals in the positive mood 
condition were more confident than those in the negative mood condition, F(1,51) =  
5.77.  This main effect remained significant, F(1,50) =  4.70, after reading span 
performance was added as a covariate.  Reading span was not a significant covariate of 
confidence for the young adults.  For older adults, individuals in the negative mood 
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condition were more confident than those in the positive mood condition, F(1,46) = 4.68.  
This main effect remained significant, F(1,45) = 4.66, when reading span performance 
was included as a covariate.  Reading span was itself a significant covariate of confidence 
for older adults in the positive and negative mood conditions (rconfidence,Rspan = -0.33, p < 
.05.)  
 Given the findings associated with hypothesis #1, we were also curious to see if 
age-related differences in confidence for participants in the neutral condition remained 
after controlling for individual differences in baseline working memory performance.  
Adding baseline working memory performance as a covariate to an ANOVA examining 
age-related differences in attributional confidence did not change the outcome of the 
analyses; a strong age-related effect remained after controlling for individual differences 
in baseline working memory performance.  Reading span performance was not a 
significant covariate.  Additionally, the significant interaction between mood condition 
and age-group for the participants’ attributional confidence that was described with 
hypothesis #2 remained significant after controlling for individual differences in baseline 
working memory capacity.  Here again, working memory performance was not a 
significant covariate of participant confidence.    
 Hypothesis #5 – Summary.  Controlling for individual differences in baseline 
cognitive functioning did not eliminate mood- and age-related differences in the 
participants’ confidence in their attributions. 
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Additional analyses 
 Attitude-Attribution Task.  When examining within-subject differences in the 
extremity scores and in the confidence ratings between the first and second 
administration of the attitude-attribution essay task, only young adults in the negative 
mood condition demonstrated significant time of assessment effects.  More specifically, 
young adults in the negative mood condition had lower extremity ratings in the first essay 
task (M = 1.96, SD = 0.68) than in the second essay task (M = 2.24, SD = 0.83), t(24) = 
2.06.  Young adults in the negative mood condition also had lower confidence ratings in 
the first essay task (M = 2.64, SD =0.95) than in the second essay task (M = 3.08, SD = 
1.15), t(24) = 2.68.  Finally, neither the participants’ own attitude towards capital 
punishment nor the participant’s assessment of the quality of the target’s essay accounted 
for mood or age-related differences in the attitude-attribution extremity scores or 
confidence ratings.  For older adults, however, the more the target’s essay conflicted with 
the participant’s own beliefs on capital punishment, the greater the essay recall 
performance (r = -.29, p < .01). 
 Emotional reactivity: Affect ratings between time 1 and time 2.  Although past 
research suggests that young and older adults do not differ in their subjective ratings of 
emotion, more recent studies have found evidence for age-related disparity in such 
ratings.  More specifically, when older adults are exposed to films which present age-
relevant themes (e.g., loss of a loved one, death and dying, life-threatening disease), they 
tend to provide greater subjective ratings of sadness than younger adults who are exposed 
to the same films (Kunzmann & Gruhn, in press).  In the current study, participants in the 
negative mood condition viewed a film segment which portrayed a mother who was 
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forced to abandon one of her two children in a Nazi concentration camp.  The contents of 
this negative film were associated with the loss of a family member and with World War 
II.  Relative to the young adults sampled for this study, the events portrayed in the film 
may have had more of a personal impact on the older adults participating in this study.  
Consequently, a series of analyses were conducted to examine age-related differences in 
the participants’ emotional reactivity to the film shown in the negative mood condition. 
 Whereas young (M = 1.44; SD = 0.77) and older (M = 1.25; SD = 0.55) adults in 
the negative mood condition did not differ in their baseline (i.e., time 1) ratings of 
sadness, t(43) = 0.93 (p > 0.35), older adults (M = 3.50, SD = 1.40) displayed higher 
levels of sadness after viewing the negative film than did the young adults (M = 2.64, SD 
= 1.15), t(43) = 2.27.  A mixed model ANOVA conducted on the sadness ratings of 
participants in the negative mood condition using age group as a between-subjects 
variable and time of assessment as a within-subjects variable yielded a significant main 
effect of time of assessment, F(1,43) = 77.11.  This main effect was qualified by a 
significant time of assessment by age group interaction, F(1,43) = 7.14.  Although the 
negative mood induction increased sadness above baseline for both the young and older 
adults, the older adults displayed a significantly heightened level of sadness.  Despite the 
emergence of age-related differences in the subjective ratings of the participants’ induced 
sadness, negative reactivity itself, as assessed using either the time 2 sadness rating or a 
time 1 to time 2 difference score, was not systematically correlated with the participants’ 







Age-Related Differences in the Correspondence Bias   
 As has been established in many studies conducted by Blanchard-Fields and 
Horhota, older adults in the current study were more susceptible to the correspondence 
bias than young adults (Blanchard-Fields, Chen, Horhota, & Wang, 2004; Blanchard-
Fields & Horhota, 2004; Horhota & Blanchard-Fields, 2002).  Older adults demonstrated 
both more extreme attitude-attributions and higher confidence in these attributions than 
young adults in the neutral mood condition.  Although the older adults were more biased 
in their attributions than the young adults, both young and older adults were aware of the 
situational constraint underlying the essay writer’s actions.  Provided that both young and 
older participants use the situational constraint to correct the dispositional attributions 
which they form in response to the contents of the essay, it is possible that the situational 
constraint is not as accessible to older adults at the time of the attitude-attribution.   
Mood and Age-Related Differences in Attitude-Attributions 
 Interestingly, within the three different mood conditions, this pattern of age-
differences did not always hold.  In the negative mood condition, older adults were much 
more extreme in their attributions than the young adults.  Conversely, in the positive 
mood condition, young and older adults did not differ in the extremity of their 
attributions.  However, because we were unable to replicate previous research on mood’s 
influence on the attitude-attributions of young adults, it is impossible to discuss the 
possible factors that might be driving age-related differences in the correspondence bias 
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strictly in the context of the participants’ attitude-attribution data.  Originally, we had 
predicted that the mood would influence the correspondence bias of young adults in the 
same way that it had in past research (Forgas, 1998).  That is, relative to the neutral mood 
condition, we expected positive moods to lead to more extreme attributions and negative 
moods to lead to less extreme attributions in young adults.  Despite the fact that we did 
not replicate this pattern of results in our young adult sample’s attributions, the pattern 
did emerge in the confidence ratings of the young adults.  
Confidence Ratings as an Indicator of the Correspondence Bias 
 The current study extended past research by including a confidence assessment in 
conjunction with the attitude-attribution.  Confidence levels have been described as a 
better tool for assessing participant susceptibility to the correspondence bias because, as 
indicators of judgmental uncertainty, they are more immune to experimental demand than 
are the attitude-attribution judgments themselves (Devine, 1989).  Even so, past research 
on the correspondence bias does not specify how confidence ratings are influenced by 
experimental manipulations of mood.  Previous research on the correspondence bias does 
suggest, however, that meaningful differences which emerge in attitude-attributions also 
emerge in the participants’ confidence levels (Devine, 1989; Miller, Schmidt, Meyer, 
Colella, 1984).  In other words, less extreme attitude-attributions are usually associated 
with lower levels of confidence, as was the case in this study (r = .517, n = 165, p < 
.001).  Further, experimental factors which are hypothesized to lead to less extreme 
attributions should also lead to lower levels of confidence, and vice versa.      
   If this relationship between attributions and confidence ratings holds true, then 
mood should influence the confidence ratings of young adults in the same way that it 
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influenced the attitude-attributions of young adults in past research on mood and the 
correspondence bias.  More specifically, positive moods should lead young adults to be 
more confident in their attributions, whereas negative moods should lead young adults to 
be less confident.  As was described in the results section, this is the exact pattern that 
emerged for the young adults’ confidence ratings in the current study.  Young adults were 
more confident in their attitude-attributions in the positive mood condition, whereas 
young adults were less confident in the negative mood condition.  These results are 
consistent with past interpretations of mood’s influence on young adult behavior (Forgas, 
1998; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993).  When in a positive mood, young adults are 
less motivated to carefully process all of the information that is available to them when 
forming an impression.  Instead, they are satisfied with using a more global, heuristic 
form of processing which assigns more weight to those pieces of information that are 
immediately accessible to them.  In this case, the most accessible pieces of information 
were the dispositional characteristics of the target that were inferred by the positive 
participant while reading the essay in the attitude-attribution task.  On the other hand, 
when in a negative mood state, young adults are motivated to more carefully consider all 
of the information that is available to them.  It is possible that adopting a more effortful, 
focused form of processing improves the likelihood that the situational constraint will 
remain accessible when the negative participant is asked to rate the target’s attitude.  
Interestingly, mood influenced the confidence ratings of older adults in exactly the 
opposite way.   
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Mood and Age-Related Differences in Confidence Ratings 
 In our original predictions, we expected that, relative to the neutral mood 
condition, both positive and negative moods would lead older adults to be more 
susceptible to the correspondence bias.  Given the results of the current study, we were 
only half right.  Negative moods led to higher levels of confidence in older adults, 
whereas positive moods led to lower levels of confidence.  Based upon the literature 
examining emotion and aging, we had no reason to predict that positive moods would 
influence the attributions of young and older adults differently.  As mentioned earlier, 
findings from recent research conducted by Phillips et al. (2002) suggest that positive 
moods impair the executive functioning of both young and older adults.  Consequently, 
we hypothesized that positive moods would lead both young and older adults to be more 
susceptible to the correspondence bias.  Interestingly, whereas positive moods led young 
adults to be more confident in their attributions in the current study, positive moods led 
older adults to be less confident.  Essentially, older adults were less susceptible to the 
correspondence bias when they were in a positive mood state.   
 Given that young and older adults differ in the emotional goals that they carry into 
social situations (Carstensen et al., 1999), it is possible that young and older adults 
interpret their positive moods in different ways.  If it truly the case that older adults are 
much more likely than young adults to continuously scrutinize their state of well-being, 
then experiencing a positive mood may grant older adults temporary access to cognitive 
resources that were previously devoted to the miserly monitoring of their mood state.  
This temporary boost may help older adults to more carefully deliberate both the essay 
written by the target and the instructions to the target.  This interpretation of the results is 
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consistent with the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions which suggests that 
positive moods can lead individuals to drop their defenses in order to approach tasks from 
novel perspectives (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson & Branigan, in press).  It is also 
consistent with past research which demonstrates that happy moods can increase the 
cognitive capacity that is available for completing effortful tasks by leading individuals to 
rely on general knowledge structures when performing more routine tasks (Bless, Clore, 
Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wölk, 1996).  Of course, additional research is needed to 
prove that (a) positive mood states are interpreted differently by young and older adults, 
and (b) such differences in motivation actually confer cognitive advantages to older 
adults.  
 As was anticipated, the attributional reasoning of young and older adults was also 
differentially impacted by the negative mood induction.  Whereas young adults were less 
confident in their attributions when they were in a negative mood, older adults were more 
confident when they were in a negative mood.  It appears that negative mood states 
motivate young adults to more carefully consider the situational constraint placed on the 
essay writer when forming their impressions.  Because older adults were more 
susceptible to the correspondence bias when they were in a negative mood, it appears that 
negative moods did not lead the situational constraint to be as accessible to older adults 
when forming their attitude-attribution of the essay writer.   
 We hypothesized that this disparity in attributional reasoning would be due to the 
older adults’ preoccupation with maintaining a positive sense of well-being.  Two pieces 
of evidence emerged to support this assertion.  First, although both young and older 
adults in the negative mood condition demonstrated significant improvement in their 
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mood after the mood induction, older adults demonstrated a greater amount of overall 
improvement (e.g., see time 2 and time 3 happiness and sadness ratings in Figures 1 and 
2).  The source of this difference in improvement arose from the effect that the negative 
mood induction had on the sadness ratings of young and older adults.  More specifically, 
older adults exhibited a greater amount of sadness than young adults in response to 
viewing the negative film clip.  Because both age groups recovered to the same level of 
baseline sadness, the uneven starting point immediately after the mood induction creates 
the impression that older adults had to put forth more effort than young adults to recover 
from their sadness.  Second, young and older adults in the negative mood condition 
provided slightly different responses to the thought-listing task administered at the end of 
the experiment.  When asked to list those things that they were thinking about during the 
course of the study, young and older adults were equally as likely to mention that the 
negative mood induction created some form of negative affect within them.  Relative to 
all of the possible thoughts listed within each age group and mood condition, older adults 
in the negative mood condition were more likely than young adults to provide a 
description of (a) why the film clip from the mood induction put them in a negative mood 
state, or (b) how the contents of the film clip pertained to the state of humanity today.  
Thoughts like these were coded in a category under the heading ‘emotion reactivity, 
release, and regulation’ (inter-rater reliability for all participants on all items coded: α = 
87.8%).  Only a few young and older adults specifically mentioned consciously 
regulating their emotional responses to the negative film clip.  Several participants in the 
current study, however, described having thoughts which appeared to resemble some 
form of emotional release.  Of course, this is not concrete evidence that young and older 
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adults were differentially motivated to regulate their negative emotions.  A more direct 
investigation of the immediate coping behaviors of young and older adults in response to 
experiencing negative emotions is needed before such a claim can be made. 
Mood- and Age-Related Effects on Confidence: Controlling Baseline Cognitive Ability
 In addition to examining mood and age-related differences in the correspondence 
bias, the present study also sought to examine the role that cognitive ability played in 
mediating attributional reasoning.  To do this, we examined baseline working memory 
performance as a covariate of the participants’ confidence levels.  Within each age group, 
mood’s influence on attributional confidence was not eliminated by controlling for 
individual differences in the baseline assessment of this cognitive ability.  This suggests 
that mood influences one’s susceptibility to the correspondence bias regardless of one’s 
baseline working memory capacity.   Additionally, when confidence ratings were 
examined between the age groups, individual differences in working memory did not 
eliminate the age group by mood interaction that emerged in participant confidence.  
These findings support the idea that age-related differences and individual differences in 
baseline cognitive performance do not always play a major role in the social reasoning 
ability of young and older adults. 
Limitations 
 Although we were expecting distinct differences to emerge in the attitude-
attributions of participants in the positive and negative mood conditions, the attributions 
made in each of these mood conditions were not significantly different than those made 
in the neutral mood condition.  Because the trends of the mean attitude-attribution ratings 
within the young adult sample were in the expected direction, it is possible that a more 
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effective mood induction would have strengthened these effects.  Past research on mood 
and the correspondence bias involved a success-failure manipulation to induce the 
desired mood states in young adults (Forgas, 1998).  It is possible that the success-failure 
mood manipulation technique is a stronger mood induction technique than that which was 
used in the current study.   
 Additionally, studies conducted to examine the correspondence bias using the 
attitude-attribution paradigm (Jones & Harris, 1967) have traditionally included both the 
writer-unconstrained (‘choice’) and writer-constrained (‘no-choice’) conditions.  Because 
past research did not yield age-related attributional differences in the ‘choice’ condition 
(Horhota & Blanchard-Fields, 2002), we felt that it was unnecessary to include the 
‘choice’ condition in this study.  Additionally most studies of the correspondence bias 
incorporating the attitude-attribution paradigm typically use social issues for the essay 
stimuli which clearly have popular and unpopular positions in the population.  A more 
stringent examination of dispositional biases would then involve examining the 
attributional tendencies of those participants who read the unpopular essay in the no-
choice condition.  If a participant rates the author’s attitude as being correspondent with 
the position in the essay in this case, then the dispositional bias is exacerbated by the fact 
that the participant is not fully considering the situational constraint nor the average 
position endorsed by the vast majority of the population.  For this study, we chose to use 
a social issue (i.e., capital punishment) which was roughly evenly supported and opposed 
in the population.  Although using this strategy allowed us to aggregate the participants in 
each essay position condition, it does not allow us to directly examine the influence that 
favorableness of the essay position has on the participants’ attributional reasoning.  
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Future studies will undoubtedly examine the influence that issue favorableness has on 
age-related differences in the correspondence bias.    
Conclusion 
 In summary, this study demonstrates that age-related differences in the 
correspondence bias are influenced by the mood state of the participant.  Young adults 
were less susceptible to the correspondence bias when they were in a negative mood, but 
they were more susceptible when they were in a positive mood.  Conversely, older adults 
were more susceptible to the correspondence bias when they were in a negative mood, 
but they were less susceptible in a positive mood.  The findings from this study also 
provide support for the hypothesis that social judgments can be influenced by age-related 
differences in affect management.  Additional studies are needed to better substantiate 
age-related differences in the emotion regulation goals and strategies that are used by 
young and older adults to deal with the emotions that are experienced in an online, 
immediate social situation.  Moreover, a wider sampling of age groups and measurement 
occasions are needed to actually study change in age-related differences in socio-






Instructions to the Target for the “in favor of” capital punishment condition 
 
Below are the instructions that were given to the students who took part in the study.  
Once you have finished reading the instructions, please read the essay that follows on 
the next page and estimate the writer’s actual position on this issue.  That is, what 
does the writer truly believe about capital punishment?  Keep in mind that the writer 
was given the following instructions: 
 
“Please write a short essay in favor of capital punishment, regardless of your own 
attitude towards capital punishment.  What is important is your ability to generate 
arguments and reason about a social issue.  Please keep your essay shorter than 




Instructions to the Target for the “opposed to” capital punishment condition 
 
Below are the instructions that were given to the students who took part in the study.  
Once you have finished reading the instructions, please read the essay that follows on 
the next page and estimate the writer’s actual position on this issue.  That is, what 
does the writer truly believe about capital punishment?  Keep in mind that the writer 
was given the following instructions: 
 
“Please write a short essay opposed to capital punishment, regardless of your own 
attitude towards capital punishment.  What is important is your ability to generate 
arguments and reason about a social issue.  Please keep your essay shorter than 






Target Writer’s Essay Endorsing Capital Punishment 
Capital punishment should be legal in all states (1).  There are many reasons for 
having this position (2).  Capital punishment decreases crime (3) because it acts as a 
deterrent to criminals who engage in serious or life-threatening illegal activities (4).  
By eliminating hardened criminals, capital punishment decreases the number of 
individuals who are in prison at a given time (5).  This is also a useful way to reduce 
the amount of money that the government has to spend on the upkeep of prison 
facilities (6).  Another benefit is that capital punishment teaches morality to young 
people (7) by making it clear that there are consequences for committing crimes (8).  
Moreover, capital punishment is the only just means to punish a convicted murderer 
(9).  Finally, by putting serious offenders to death, capital punishment can provide 
closure to those families who have been victimized by criminals (10).  Clearly there 
are many good reasons why capital punishment should be legal in all states (11). 
 
Number of sentences: 9 
Number of words: 151 




Target Writer’s Essay Opposing Capital Punishment 
 
Capital punishment should not be legal in any state (1).  There are many reasons for 
having this position (2).  Because capital punishment involves the death of a criminal, 
it is itself a form of murder (3) and it will only increase the amount of violence in 
society (4).  Also, there is the potential that capital punishment may execute an 
innocent person (5).  Once convicted of a crime that carries the death penalty, the 
accused is less likely to receive an unbiased appeal (6).  Another problem is that 
capital punishment is out of date (7); in this day and age, every western democracy 
except this country has abolished the death penalty (8). Moreover, capital punishment 
does not leave room for rehabilitation (9). Finally, by putting serious offenders to 
death, capital punishment does not provide psychological closure to the families of 
those who are victimized by criminals (10).  Clearly there are many good reasons 
why capital punishment should not be legal in any state (11). 
 
Number of sentences: 9 
Number of words: 151 
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